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I study the advantages of pollution permit markets over traditional standard regulations
when the regulator has incomplete information on firms’ emissions and costs of production
and abatement (e.g., air pollution in large cities). Because the regulator only observes
each firm’s abatement technology but neither its emissions nor its output, there are cases
in which standards can lead to lower emissions and, hence, welfare dominate permits. If
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1 Introduction
In recent years, environmental policy makers are paying more attention to pollution mar-
kets (i.e., tradable emission permits) as an alternative to the traditional command-and-control
(CAC) approach of setting emission and technology standards. A notable example is the 1990
U.S. acid rain program that implemented a nationwide market for electric utilities’ sulfur diox-
ide (SO2) emissions (Schmalensee et al., 1998; Ellerman et al., 2000). In order to have a precise
estimate of the SO2 emissions that are coming out of the stack, the acid rain program requires
each aﬀected electric utility unit to install costly equipment that can continuously monitor
emissions.1
This and other market experiences show that conventional permits markets are being imple-
mented only in those cases where emissions can be closely monitored, which almost exclusively
occurs in large stationary sources like electric power plants and refineries. It is not surprising
then, that environmental authorities continue relying on CAC instruments to regulate emissions
from smaller sources because compliance with such instruments only requires the authority to
ensure that the regulated source has installed the required abatement technology or that its
emissions per unit of output are equal or lower than a certain emissions rate standard. These
observations raise a natural question: could the compliance flexibility of permit trading be ex-
tended to the regulation of sources whose emissions can only be imperfectly measured through
the observation of their abatement technologies or emission rates (where the firm’s output or
utilization is not observable to infer emissions)?
This would be a second-best permits scheme in that sources are not trading emissions but
1Another example with similar monitoring requirements is the Southern California RECLAIM program that
implemented separated markets for nitrogen oxide (NOx) and SO2 emissions from power plants, refineries and
other large stationary sources. This program did not include a market for volatile organic compounds (VOC) in
large part because of the diﬃculties with monitoring actual emissions from smaller and heterogeneous sources
(Harrison, 1999).
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some proxy for emissions (e.g., maximum possible emissions), which raises the possibility that
actual emissions under permits could eventually be higher (or lower) than under an alternative
CAC regulation. In fact, emissions are likely to be higher if the trade pattern is such that
lower-output firms sell permits to higher-output firms. The latter may explain, at least in
part, why pollution markets are virtually absent in the control of air pollution in large cities
where emissions come from many small (stationary and mobile) sources rather than a few large
stationary sources.2 Rather than disregard pollution markets as a policy tool, however, the
challenge faced by policy makers is when and how to implement these markets using monitoring
procedures that are similar to those under CAC regulation.
Most of the literature on environmental regulation under asymmetric information deals
with the case in which firms’ costs are privately known but emissions are publicly observed (see
Lewis (1996) for a survey). While there is some literature considering imperfect observation of
emissions (e.g., Segerson, 1988; Fullerton and West, 2002; Cremer and Gahvari, 2002),3 there
seems to be no work specifically studying the eﬀect of imperfect information about emissions and
costs on the design and performance of a permits market. Yet, it is interesting to observe that
despite its limited information on each source’s actual emissions (and costs), Santiago-Chile’s
environmental agency has already implemented a (small) market to control total suspended
particulate (TSP) emissions from a group of about 600 stationary sources (Montero et al.,
2002).4 Based on estimates from annual inspection for technology parameters such as each
2Note that there are some credit-based trading programs aimed at curbing air pollution in urban areas working
in the US (Tietenberg, 1985). New sources (or expansion of existing ones) must acquire emission credits to cover
their emissions through, for example, shutting down existing plants or scrapping old vehicles. Although these
programs have the merit of involving small sources, they are very limited in scope in the sense that they are
embedded within an existing CAC regulation and are particularly designed to prevent further deterioration of
air quality from the entry of new sources.
3Segerson (1988) studies the control of emissions from (few) non-point sources using a “moral hazard in teams”
approach. Fullerton and West (2002) consider the control of vehicle emissions using a combination of taxes on
cars and on gasoline as an alternative to an (unavailable) tax on emissions. Cremer and Gahvari (2002) look at
output and emission taxation under costly (rather than imperfect) monitoring.
4These 600 sources aﬀected by the TSP program are responsible for only 5% of 2000 TSP emissions in
Santiago. Remaining TSP sources are controlled through CAC regulation.
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source’s size and fuel type, Santiago’s environmental regulator approximates each source’s actual
emissions by the maximum amount of emissions that the source could potentially emit in a given
year. In particular, the observable firm’s emission rate (i.e., emissions per unit of output) is
multiplied by its maximum possible output to infer its maximum emissions for which the firm
must buy permits.5
Motivated by Santiago’s TSP permits program,6 in this paper I study the instrument design
and choice problem associated with the implementation of a pollution market in which the
regulator faces several information constraints. In doing so, in the next section (Section 2)
I develop a theoretical model for an industry of heterogenous firms that produce output and
pollution as a by-product. Each firm has private information about its emissions, abatement
costs, and production costs. I first show that the regulator cannot implement the first-best when
emissions are imperfectly measured (even in the absence of budget constraints and perfect cost
information). In Section 3, I derive the optimal design of the two policy instruments discussed
above: standards and permits. I focus on these two (second-best) policies rather than on
more optimal ones not only because the latter include the use of nonlinear instruments and
transfers to firms that have not been used in practice (Stavins, 2003; Hahn et al., 2003), but
more importantly, because I want specifically to explore whether permits can still provide an
important welfare advantage over traditional CAC regulation when emissions are imperfectly
monitored.
In Section 4, I discuss the conditions under which the permits policy is welfare superior to the
standards policy. On the one hand, the permits policy retains the well known cost-eﬀectiveness
5As we shall see later, using the source’s maximum emissions as a proxy does not prevent any adverse eﬀects
that the use of permits (instead of CAC regulation) could eventually have on aggregate emissions. The choice of
proxy is an arbitrary matter because the number of permits being allocated can always be adjusted accordingly
with no eﬃciency eﬀects.
6Variations of the permit trading programs documented in USEPA (2001) face similar issues because these
are programs that are not based on actual emissions (e.g., the averaging programs for mobile sources or the
fireplace permit trading in Colorado).
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property of conventional permits programs, namely that permit trading allows heterogenous
firms to reduce their abatement and production costs. On the other hand, the permits policy
can sometimes provide firms with incentives to choose combinations of output and abatement
technology that may lead to higher aggregate emissions than under standards. Thus, when
(abatement and production) cost heterogeneity across firms is large, the permits policy is likely
to work better. In contrast, as heterogeneity disappears, the advantage of permits reduces, and
standards might work better provided that they lead to lower emissions.7
Permits can result in higher emissions in two situations, and hence, can be potentially welfare
dominated by standards. The first case is when firms with relatively large output ex-ante (i.e.,
before the regulation) are choosing low abatement (i.e., the case with a negative correlation
between production and abatement costs). When this is so, permits induce primarily low-output
firms to install abatement technologies, while standards force all firms to invest in abatement.
The second case is when firms doing more abatement find it optimal to reduce output ex-post.
In this case, the permits policy has the disadvantage of reducing the output of firms installing
more abatement technologies relative to the output of those doing less abatement. This problem
is less significant under standards because all firms are required to install similar technologies.
The instrument choice problem studied in this paper is similar in spirit and approach to
the instrument choice dilemma considered by Weitzman (1974), but with important diﬀerences.
Weitzman (1974) compares the relative advantage of a price instrument (taxes) over a quantity
instrument when the regulator has imperfect information about the aggregate abatement cost
curve (and possibly about the damage curve as well). Thus, cost heterogeneity across firms
plays no role in Weitzman’s analysis. Instead, I compare the performance of two diﬀerent
7Note that when emissions are accurately measured and the total number of permits is set at the eﬃcient
(i.e., first-best) level, permits are always welfare superior to standards even if the latter leads to lower aggregate
emissions. When emissions are not accurately measured, permits are no longer a first-best policy.
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quantity instruments and focus on the eﬀect of cost heterogeneity on instrument performance.8
Since I ignore aggregate uncertainty, the permits policy here is no diﬀerent than a tax set equal
to the permits price and applied over the same proxy emissions.9
In deciding whether to use permits or standards, the regulator is likely to face a trade-oﬀ
between cost-eﬀectiveness and possible higher emissions, so in Section 5 I discuss the advantages
of implementing an optimal hybrid policy in which permits are combined with an optimally
chosen standard. While the introduction of the hybrid policy provides a net welfare increase
for several combinations of parameters, there are many cases in which the hybrid policy adds
nothing over the permits policy (i.e., the hybrid policy converges to the permits-alone policy).
Conversely, there are very few cases in which the hybrid policy converges to the standards-alone
policy. Final remarks are in Section 6.
2 The model
Consider a competitive market for an homogeneous good supplied by a continuum of firms of
mass 1. Each firm produces output q and emissions e of a uniform flow pollutant. To simplify
notation, I assume that when the firm does not utilize any pollution abatement device, then
e = q. Market inverse demand is given by P = P (Q), where Q is total output and P 0(Q) ≤ 0.
Total damage from pollution is given by D(E), where E are total emissions and D0(E) > 0.
Functions P (Q) and D(E) are known to the regulator.
A firm can abate pollution at a positive cost by installing technology x, which reduces
emissions from q to e = (1 − x)q. Hence, the firm’s emission rate is e/q = 1 − x. Each firm
is represented by a pair of cost parameters (β, γ). A firm of type (β, γ) has a cost function
8See also Roberton Williams (2002) for a comparison between quantity instruments in the presence of aggre-
gate uncertainty.
9As I explain below, aggregate cost uncertainty can be easily added to the model with no changes in the
comparison between permits and standards. Of course, permits and taxes will no longer be equivalent.
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C(q, x, β, γ), where β and γ are the firm’s private information. To keep the model mathemati-
cally tractable, I assume that the cost function has the following quadratic form in the relevant
output-abatement range
C(q, x, β, γ) =
c
2
q2 + βq +
k
2
x2 + γx+ vxq (1)
where c, k and v are known parameters common to all firms and c > 0, k > 0, Λ ≡ ck− v2 > 0
and v T 0. Note that the parameter v can be negative, for example, if switching to a cleaner
fuel saves on fuel costs but involves such a large retrofitting cost (i.e., high k) that no firm
switches to the cleaner and cheaper fuel unless regulated.
Function (1) incorporates two key cost parameters that are essential to understand firm be-
havior under permits and standards regulation. One of these cost parameters is the correlation
between β and γ (that we shall denote by ρ), which captures whether firms with higher output
ex-ante (i.e., before the regulation) are more or less likely to install more abatement x. The
other cost parameter is v, which captures the eﬀect of abatement on output ex-post (note that
we have constrained v to be the same for all firms, so a negative value of v indicates that, on
average, a larger x means a larger increase in q ex-post). As we shall see, the values of the
cost parameters v and ρ play a fundamental role in the design and choice of policy instruments
when emissions are not easily monitored.
Although the regulator does not observe firms’ individual values for β and γ, we assume that
she knows that they are distributed according to the cumulative joint distribution F (β, γ) on
β ∈ [β, β] and γ ∈ [γ, γ].10 To simplify notation further and without any loss of generality I let
E[β] =E[γ] = 0, where E[·] is the expected value operator.11 I also use the following notation:
10Note that we can easily add aggregate uncertainty to this formulation by simply letting βi = βi + θ and
γi = γi + η, where θ and η are random variables common to all firms.
11Note that because β and γ are negative for some firms, one can argue that marginal costs can take negative
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Var[β] ≡ σ2β, Var[γ] ≡ σ2γ , Cov[β, γ] ≡ ρσβσγ and Fβγ ≡ ∂2F (β, γ)/∂β∂γ.
Firms behave competitively, taking the output clearing price P as given. Hence, in the
absence of any environmental regulation, each firm will produce to the point where its marginal
production cost equals the product price (i.e., Cq(q, x, β, γ) = P ), and install no abatement
technology (i.e., x = 0). Because production involves some pollution, this market equilibrium
is not socially optimal. The regulator’s problem is then to design a regulation that maximizes
social welfare.
I let the regulator’s social welfare function be
W =
Z Q
0
P (z)dz −
Z β
β
Z γ
γ
C(q, x, β, γ)Fβγdγdβ −D(E) (2)
where Q =
R
β
R
γ
q(β, γ)Fβγdγdβ is total output and E =
R
β
R
γ
(1 − x(β, γ))q(β, γ)Fβγdγdβ is
total emissions. In this welfare function, the regulator does not diﬀerentiate between consumer
and producer surplus, and transfers from or to firms are lump-sum transfers between consumers
and firms, with no welfare eﬀects.12
The firms’ outputs and abatement technologies that implement the social optimum or first-
best outcome are given by the following two first-order conditions for each firm
q : P (Q)−Cq(q, x, β, γ)−D0(E) · (1− x) = 0 (3)
x : −Cx(q, x, β, γ)−D0(E) · (−q) = 0 (4)
values. This possibility is eliminated by assuming parameter values (including those in the demand and damage
functions) that lead to interior solutions for q and x in which ∂C/∂q > 0 and ∂C/∂x > 0 for all β and γ.
Furthermore, since these interior solution are assumed to fall within the range in which (1) is valid, what happens
beyond this range is not relevant for the analysis of instrument design and choice that follows. Alternatively, one
can let β ∈ [β > 0, β] and γ ∈ [γ > 0, γ] with additional constant terms in the optimal instrument designs but
no change in the welfare comparisons.
12The model can be generalized by allowing the regulator to consider a weight µ 6= 1 for firm profits and a
shadow cost λ > 0 for public funds. However, this would not add much to our discussion unless permits are not
grandfathered but auctioned oﬀ (see Goulder et al., 1997).
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If rearranged, eq. (3) says that the benefits from consuming an additional (small) unit of output
is equal to its cost of production and environmental eﬀects. Eq (4), on the other hand, says
that emissions should be reduced to the point where the marginal cost of emissions abatement
(i.e., Cx/q) is equal to marginal damages (i.e., D0(E)).
Because of various information asymmetries between firms and the regulator, it is not clear
that the latter can design an environmental policy that can attain the first-best resource alloca-
tion. The regulator’s problem then becomes to maximize (2) subject to information constraints
(and sometimes administrative and political constraints as well). From the various possible
types of information constraints, the case that has attracted most attention in the literature
is that in which the regulator knows little or nothing about firms’ costs (i.e., she may not
know F ) but can costlessly monitor each firm’s actual emissions e (Kwerel, 1977; Dasgupta et
al.,1980; Spulber, 1988; Lewis, 1996). These authors show that in many cases the first-best can
be implemented, such as when the regulator announces a (non-linear) emissions tax schedule
τ(E) equal to D0(E).13
In this paper, however, I am interested in the problem where the regulator cannot directly
observe firms’ actual emissions e = (1− x)q, although she can costlessly monitor firms’ abate-
ment technologies or emission rates x. As in Santiago’s permits program, this information
asymmetry will be present when both continuous monitoring equipment is prohibitively costly
and individual output or utilization q is not observable.14 Thus, if the regulator asks for an
output report from the firm, we anticipate that the firm would misreport its output whenever
13A competitive firm (β, γ) takes the price P (Q) and tax rate τ(E) = D0(E) as given and maximize
π(q, x, β, γ) = P (Q)q − C(q, x, β, γ) − D0(E) · (1 − x)q with respect to q and x. The firm’s first order con-
ditions for q and x are those given by (3) and (4).
14 In Santiago’s TSP program, the imperfect observability of output comes from the fact that the regulator
does not observe (neither can estimate) the number of hours that boilers and ovens of industrial sources, and
heaters of residential and commercial buildings are operated during the year. The regulation of mobile sources
is another example where the regulator faces severe constraints to observe or estimate vehicle use (Fullerton and
West, 2002).
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this was to its advantage. In this case, the regulator cannot implement the social optimum
regardless of the information she has about firm’s costs.15
Even if the regulator has perfect knowledge of the firm’s costs and, therefore, can ex-post
deduce output based on this information and the observation of x, the fact that she cannot
make the policy contingent on either emissions or output prevents her from implementing the
first-best. In other words, the regulator cannot induce the optimal amounts of output and
emissions with only one instrument (i.e., x).16 Consequently, the regulator must necessarily
content herself with less optimal policies.
3 Instrument design
Rather than considering a full range of policies, I focus here on those policies that are either
currently implemented or have drawn some degree of attention from policy makers in the context
of urban air pollution control (Stavins, 2003). I first study the optimal design of a traditional
technology (or emission rate) standard and then the optimal design of a permits market. I leave
the optimal design of the hybrid policy, which builds upon the individual designs, for Section
5. To keep the model tractable, I make two further simplifications regarding the demand curve
and the damage function. I let P (Q) = P (constant) and D(E) = hE, where h > v.17
To visualize how the two policy designs depart from the social optimum, it is useful to
compute the first-best and keep it as a benchmark. Plugging the above assumptions into (3)
15Consider the extreme situation in which regulator knows both β and γ. His optimal policy will be some
function T (x;β, γ) in the form of either a transfer from the firm or to the firm. Then, firm (β, γ) takes P (Q)
and T (x;β, γ) as given and maximizes π(q, x, β, γ) = P (Q)q − C(q, x, β, γ)− T (x;β, γ) with respect to q and x.
It is not diﬃcult to see that the firm’s first order conditions for q and x will always diﬀer from (3) and (4) for
any function T (x;β, γ).
16Since the regulator can have a good idea of total emissions E from air quality measures, one might argue
that Holmström’s (1982) approach to solving moral hazard problems in teams may apply here as well. However,
in our context this approach is unfeasible because the large number of agents would require too much transfers;
either from firms as penalties or to firms as subsidies.
17Because costs are always lower under the permits policy, a backward sloping demand would lead to higher
output, and hence, to higher surplus under such policy. On the other hand, a convex damage function will make
the policy leading to lower emissions look relatively more attractive.
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and (4), the first-best outcome is given by
x∗ =
(P − h− β)(h− v)− γc
ck − (h− v)2 (5)
q∗ =
(P − h− β)k − (h− v)γ
ck − (h− v)2 (6)
It is immediate that ∂x∗/∂β < 0, ∂x∗/∂γ < 0, ∂q∗/∂β < 0 and ∂q∗/∂γ < 0. As expected,
higher production and abatement costs lead to lower abatement and output levels.
3.1 Standards
The regulator’s problem here is to find the emission rate standard xs to be required of all firms
in order to maximize social welfare (subscript “s” denotes standards policy). The regulator
knows that for any given xs,18 firm (β, γ) will maximize π(q, xs, β, γ) = Pq − C(q, xs, β, γ).
Hence, the firm’s (β, γ) output decision will solve the first-order condition
P − cq − β − vxs = 0
which provides the regulator with the firm’s output q as a function of the standard xs
qs(xs) ≡ qs =
P − β − vxs
c
(7)
Since xs is the same across firms, the firm’s output clearly departs from its first-best level q∗,
as qs does not adapt to changes in γ.
18 It is implicitly assumed that k is large enough, so that the standard is binding for all firms even if v < 0.
More precisely, it is assumed that dπ(xs)/dxs = −(kxs + γ + vq) < 0 for all γ.
11
Based on the welfare function (2), the regulator now solves
max
xs
Z β
β
Z γ
γ
[Pqs − C(qs, xs)− h · (1− xs)qs]Fβγdγdβ
By the envelope theorem, the first-order condition is
Z β
β
Z γ
γ
·
−kxs − γ − vqs − h · (1− xs) ∂qs
∂xs
+ hqs
¸
Fβγdγdβ = 0 (8)
By using (7) and ∂qs/∂xs = −v/c in (8), the first-order condition (8) reduces to
−ckxs − v · (P − vxs) + h · (1− xs)v + h · (P − vxs) = 0
which leads to the optimal standard
x∗s =
P · (h− v) + hv
Λ+ 2vh
(9)
where Λ ≡ ck − v2 > 0.
3.2 Permits
Since the regulator only observes x, the permits policy is not based on actual emissions e but
on some proxy for emissions that we denote by e. The regulator’s problem is then to find the
total number of permits e0 to be distributed among firms in order to maximize social welfare
(e0 is also the numbers of permits received by each firm). Let R denote the equilibrium price
of permits, which will be determined shortly.19 The regulator knows that firm (β, γ) will take
19Note that under a tax policy, the optimal price R will be the tax. If we add aggregate uncertainty to the
model, the tax and permit policies will not be equivalent from an eﬃciency standpoint (Weitzman, 1974).
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R as given and solve
max
q,x
π(q, x, β, γ) = Pq − C(q, x, β, γ)−R · (e− e0)
where e = (1 − x)eq are firm’s proxy emissions and eq is some arbitrarily output or utilization
level that is common to all firms. For example, eq could be set equal to the maximum possible
output that could ever be observed, which would occur when x = 0 and β = β. As we shall
see shortly, the exact value of eq turns out to be irrelevant because it simply works as a scaling
factor. Note that if e< e0, the firm will be a seller of permits.
>From a firm’s first-order conditions
x : − kx− γ − vq +Req = 0 (10)
q : P − cq − β − vx = 0 (11)
we have that the optimal abatement and output responses to R and eq (or, more precisely, to
Req) of firm (β, γ) are
xp =
Reqc− γc− (P − β)v
Λ
(12)
qp =
P − β − vxp
c
(13)
where the subscript “p” denotes permits policy. Comparing (12) and (13) with (5) and (6) illus-
trates the trade-oﬀ a regulator may face when implementing a permits program with imperfect
observation of emissions. While ∂qp/∂β and ∂xp/∂γ are negative as in the first-best, regardless
of the sign of v, ∂qp/∂γ and ∂xp/∂β are both positive when v > 0.20
Now we can solve the regulator’s problem of finding the optimal e0. Since the market
20Note that ∂qp/∂β = −k/Λ, ∂xp/∂β = ∂qp/∂γ = v/Λ and ∂xp/∂γ = −c/Λ.
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clearing condition is
Z β
β
Z γ
γ
eFβγdγdβ = Z β
β
Z γ
γ
(1− xp)eqFβγdγdβ = e0 (14)
and xp is a function of Req as indicated by (12), it is irrelevant whether we solve for Req or e0/eq.
Permits purchases and sales are transfers with no net welfare eﬀects, so we let the regulator
solve
max
Req
Z β
β
Z γ
γ
[Pqp(xp(Req))−C(qp(xp(Req)), xp(Req))− h · (1− xp(Req))qp(xp(Req))]Fβγdγdβ
By the envelope theorem, the first-order condition is
Z β
β
Z γ
γ
·
−(1− xp)h
∂qp
∂(Req) + hqp ∂xp∂(Req) −Req ∂xp∂(Req)
¸
Fβγdγdβ = 0 (15)
By plugging (12), (13), ∂qp/∂(Req) = [∂qp/∂xp][∂xp/∂(Req)], and ∂qp/∂xp = −v/c into (15), the
first-order condition can be rearranged to obtain the optimal permits price
R∗eq = Ph(kc+ v2) + hvΛ
(Λ+ 2hv)c
(16)
which, in turn, allows us to obtain the optimal permits allocation e∗0/eq by simply substituting
(16) into (12) and then into (14).
We can now replace the optimal R∗eq in (12) and (13) to obtain expressions for qp and xp
that are more readily comparable to qs and xs (see eqs. (7) and (9)). After some algebra, the
following expressions are obtained
xp = x
∗
s +
vβ − cγ
Λ
(17)
14
qp =
P − vx∗s
c
− kβ − vγ
Λ
= qs −
v2β − cvγ
cΛ
(18)
If firms are homogeneous (i.e., β = γ = 0 for all firms), then xp = x∗s and qp = qs (i.e., both
policies provide the same welfare at a level that is always lower than the first-best level; see
footnote 13). As firms become more heterogenous, x and q move in diﬀerent magnitudes and
sometimes directions depending on the policy choice, which will ultimately aﬀect the welfare
comparison between the two policies. Suppose, for example, that v > 0. As firms diﬀer on their
abatement costs γ, firms’ abatement decisions x tend to remain closer to the social optimum
x∗ under the permits regulation than under the CAC regulation since ∂x∗/∂γ and ∂xp/∂γ are
both negative.21 As firms diﬀer on their production costs β, firms’ abatement decisions remain
closer to x∗ under the CAC regulation, since ∂x∗/∂β and ∂xp/∂β have opposite signs. A similar
pattern can be found from analyzing firms’ production decisions with regard to changes in β
and γ. I study the implication on instrument choice of these and related issues more formally
in the next section.
4 Instrument choice
The regulator must now decide wether to use permits or standards (or, eventually, a combination
of both). Although by construction a hybrid policy cannot be welfare dominated by either
single-instrument policy, it is useful first to compare single-instrument policies and then to
explore the extra gains, if any, from implementing a hybrid policy.
For a regulator who is limited to use a single instrument, the diﬀerence in the social welfare
21Note that ∂x∗/∂γ = ∂xp/∂γ for v = 0.
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between the optimal permits policy and the optimal standards policy is
∆ps =Wp(e∗0/eq)−Ws(x∗s) (19)
where e∗0 is the optimal number of permits normalized by some eq and x∗s is the optimal standard.
The normative implication of (19) is that if∆ps > 0, the regulator should implement the permits
policy.
To explore under which conditions this is the case, we write (19) as
∆ps =
Z β
β
Z γ
γ
[Pqp − C(qp, xp)− (1− xp)qph− Pqs + C(qs, x∗s) + (1− x∗s)qsh]Fβγdγdβ (20)
where qp, xp, qs and x∗s can be expressed according to (17) and (18). Since Qp = Qs =
(P − vx∗s)/c, eq. (20) can be re-written as
∆ps =
Z β
β
Z γ
γ
[{C(qs, x∗s)− C(qp, xp)}+ {(1− x∗s)qs − (1− xp)qp}h]Fβγdγdβ (21)
Recalling that e = (1−x)q, the first curly bracket of the right hand side of (21) is the diﬀerence
in costs between the two policies, whereas the second curly bracket is the diﬀerence in emissions
(which multiplied by h gives the diﬀerence in pollution damages).
If we plug (17) and (18) into (21), after some algebra (21) becomes
∆ps =
v2σ2β − 2cvρσβσγ + c2σ2γ
2cΛ
−
h ·
³
kvσ2β − (kc+ v2)ρσβσγ + cvσ2γ
´
Λ2
(22)
and after collecting terms, it reduces to
∆ps = A1σ
2
β +A2σ
2
γ +A3ρσβσγ (23)
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where A1 ≡ (v2Λ − 2ckhv)/2cΛ2, A2 ≡ (cΛ− 2chv)/2Λ2 and A3 ≡ (ckh + hv2 − vΛ)/Λ2 > 0.
Since A1, A2 and ρ can be either positive, negative, or zero,22 the sign of ∆ps will depend
upon the value of the diﬀerent parameters. As the heterogeneity across firms decreases (i.e.,
σ2β and σ
2
γ approach zero), however, the welfare diﬀerence between the two policies tends to
disappear.23
The ambiguous sign of ∆ps should not be surprising given the trade-oﬀ we identified in the
previous section. Expression (22) illustrates the ambiguous sign of ∆ps more clearly. The first
term is the diﬀerence in costs between the two policies. Since −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, this term is always
positive, which indicates that the optimal permits policy is never more costly (in terms of
abatement and production) than the optimal standards policy. This is simply because permits
provide firms with such flexibility that if the standards outcome were the cheapest compliance
solution, firms will have (cost-savings) incentives to engage in permit trading until reaching
such outcome. The second term is the diﬀerence in damages, which can either be positive,
negative, or zero, depending on the value of the diﬀerent parameters of the cost function.
Hence, a permits policy will always lead to cost savings, while it can lead to either higher or
lower emissions.24
The magnitude of ∆ps depends on the value of the diﬀerent parameters of the model, but
its sign is governed by the key cost parameters v and ρ. If v = ρ = 0, for example, the
second term of (22) is zero, so ∆ps > 0 and permits do better than standards. But if v > 0
and ρ < 0, this second term becomes negative, and depending on the value of h relative to
other parameters, ∆ps may become negative as well (it would be so, for example, for σβ = σγ ,
v = 0 and ρ < −c/h). More generally, one can draw a line c∆=0 in the (v, ρ)—space that solves
22Recall that for interior solutions in all cases we must have ck > (h− v)2, ck > v2, and h > v.
23Note that the welfare diﬀerence remains if we were to consider homogeneous sources subject to common cost
shocks (denoted by β and γ), which are observed by firmst but not by the regulator.
24Recall that in the perfect monitoring case (where permits implement the first-best solution), an “optimal”
standards policy would lead to more emissions than the first-best level.
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∆ps(v, ρ) = 0. These results can be summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 1 The permits policy can lead to either higher or lower welfare than the standards
policy. A necessary condition for permits to be welfare dominated by standards is that either
ρ < 0 or v > 0.
To understand this proposition, one must first recognize that a permits program can create
incentives for shifting output from cleaner to dirtier firms, resulting in higher total emissions.
The latter could happen under two circumstances. The first case is when firms with relatively
large output ex-ante (i.e., before the regulation) are choosing low abatement, i.e., when there
is a negative correlation between production and abatement costs (ρ < 0). When this is so,
permits induce mostly low-output firms to install abatement technologies, while standards force
all firms to invest in abatement. The second case is when firms doing more abatement find it
optimal to reduce output ex-post, i.e., when there is a positive interaction between emissions
and output (v > 0). In this case, the permits policy has the disadvantage of decreasing the
output of firms installing more abatement technologies relative to the output of those doing
less abatement. This problem is minor under standards because all firms are required to install
similar technologies.
Contrary to what occurs when emissions are perfectly monitored, Proposition 1 indicates
that neither permits nor standards is the appropriate policy choice in all cases. Because of this
ambiguity, there seems to be room for a hybrid policy to improve upon either single-instrument
policy. In fact, in the classic problem of prices versus quantities under aggregate uncertainty
pioneered by Weitzman (1974), Roberts and Spence (1980) shows that a hybrid policy that
combines permits with taxes/subsidies is always superior to either permits or taxes/subsidies
alone. The reason for this result is that in Weitzman (1974) taxes are always superior in terms of
costs (lower expected compliance costs) while permits are always superior in terms of emissions
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(higher expected environmental benefits). In our problem, however, permits are always superior
in terms of costs but standards are not always superior in terms of emissions, so it remains to
be seen whether and when a hybrid policy would provide a net welfare gain.
5 The hybrid policy
The regulator’s design problem here is to find the allocation eh0 of permits (together with an
utilization factor eqh) and an emission standard xhs that maximize social welfare. The superscript
“h” stands for hybrid policy. Under this hybrid policy, firms are free to trade permits, but each
of them cannot abate less than xhs . As in the permits-alone policy, these permits will have an
equilibrium price Rheqh (the scaling factor eqh can be the same as in the permits-alone policy;
its actual value is not relevant).
Depending on the values of β and γ, the standard xhs will be binding for some firms; the rest
will abate beyond the standard and sell additional permits. Thus, we can divide the universe
of firms in two groups: those that comply with the permits policy (xh ≡ xhp and qh ≡ qhp ) and
those that comply with the standards policy (xh ≡ xhs and qh ≡ qhs ). Note that each firm in the
latter group must still cover its (proxy) emissions with permits, which will ultimately aﬀect the
equilibrium price of permits. The values of β and γ of those firms that are on the border that
divides the two groups of firms satisfy xhp = x
h
s . From the first order condition (12), we know
that
xhp =
Rheqhc− γc− (P − β)v
Λ
which combined with xhp = x
h
s gives us the boundary
γ =
v
c
β − Λ
c
xhs +R
heqh − Pv
c
≡ bγ(β) (24)
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Because the initial allocation of permits does not aﬀect behavior, firms with γ ≥ bγ(β)
will behave as in the standard-alone policy, and firms with γ < bγ(β) will behave as in the
permits-alone policy. Then, the regulator’s problem can be written as
max
xhs ,eh0/eqh
Z β
β
Z bγ(β)
γ
h
Pqhp − C(qhp , xhp , β, γ)− h(1− xhp)qhp
i
Fβγdγdβ+Z β
β
Z γ
bγ(β)
h
Pqhs − C(qhs , xhs , β, γ)− h(1− xhs )qhs
i
Fβγdγdβ (25)
where qhs , x
h
p and q
h
p can be obtained, respectively, from (7), (12) and (13) (simply add the
superscript “h”). The regulator ensures full compliance, so the market clearing condition where
all firms must cover their emissions with permits is
Z β
β
Z bγ(β)
γ
(1− xhp)eqhFβγdγdβ + Z β
β
Z γ
bγ(β)(1− xhs )eqhFβγdγdβ = eh0
Since eqh is a constant and xhp depends on Rheqh, it is clear again that it is irrelevant whether
we solve for Rheqh or eh0/eqh. As before, we solve for Rheqh. Following the derivations for the
single-instrument policies and allowing for corner solutions, the first order conditions for the
optimal hybrid policy are
Rheqh : Z β
β
Z bγ(β)
γ
"
−(1− xhp)h
∂qhp
∂(Rheqh) + hqhp ∂xhp∂(Rheqh) −Rheqh ∂xhp∂(Rheqh)
#
Fβγdγdβ
+
Z β
β
h
Pqhp − C(qhp , xhp , β, bγ(β))− h(1− xhp)qhpiFβ(β, bγ(β))dβ
−
Z β
β
h
Pqhs −C(qhs , xhs , β, bγ(β))− h(1− xhs )qhs iFβ(β, bγ(β))dβ ≤ 0
[= 0 if Rheqh > 0; < 0 if Rheqh = 0] (26)
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xhs :
Z β
β
Z γ
bγ(β)
·
−kxhs − γ − vqhs − (1− xhs )h
∂qhs
∂xhs
+ hqhs
¸
Fβγdγdβ
− Λ
c
Z β
β
h
Pqhp −C(qhp , xhp , β, bγ(β))− h(1− xhp)qhpiFβ(β, bγ(β))dβ
+
Λ
c
Z β
β
h
Pqhs − C(qhs , xhs , β, bγ(β))− h(1− xhs )qhs iFβ(β, bγ(β))dβ ≤ 0
[= 0 if xhs > 0; < 0 if x
h
s = 0] (27)
Since at bγ(β), we have that xhs = xhp and, hence, qhs = qhp , so that (26) and (27) reduce,
respectively, to
Z β
β
Z bγ(β)
γ
"
−(1− xhp)h
∂qhp
∂xhp
+ hqhp −Rheqh
#
Fβγdγdβ ≤ 0 (28)
Z β
β
Z γ
bγ(β)
·
−kxhs − γ − vqhs − (1− xhs )h
∂qhs
∂xhs
+ hqhs
¸
Fβγdγdβ ≤ 0 (29)
where ∂qhp/∂x
h
p = ∂q
h
s /∂x
h
s = −v/c.
The solution of the optimal hybrid policy can result in a corner solution if either (28) or
(29) is negative at the optimum. When (28) is negative, the hybrid policy converges to the
standards-alone policy (i.e., Rheqh = 0 and xhs = x∗s), and when (29) is negative, the hybrid
policy converges to the permits-alone policy (i.e., Rheqh = R∗eq and xhs = 0). Formal exploration
of these possibilities lead to the following proposition
Proposition 2 The optimal hybrid policy converges to the optimal permits-alone policy for
many combinations of v and ρ (e.g., v = 0 and ρ = 0; v < 0 and ρ = 1). On the other hand, the
optimal hybrid policy may converge to the optimal standards-alone policy when abatement cost
heterogeneity is significantly smaller than production cost heterogeneity and there is a negative
correlation between abatement costs and production costs (e.g., −γ/β < (h− v)/c and ρ = −1).
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Contrary to other models (e.g., Roberts and Spence, 1980; Kwerel, 1980), in this model
the combination of instruments does not necessarily lead to higher welfare. Since permits are
not only less costly than standards but also can lead to lower emissions, it is reasonable to
think that in such cases standards may add nothing to the policy design. Take, for example,
the simple case in which v < 0 and ρ = 1. To see why here the introduction of a standard in
addition to permits is not welfare increasing, consider the eﬀect of a very mild standard (i.e.,
xhs close to cero) that is just binding for one firm (all the other firms are reducing beyond the
standard). When ρ = 1, the binding firm is exactly the one with the highest abatement and
production costs (i.e., β = β and γ = γ). The introduction of the standard is clearly ineﬃcient
because the extra reduction is coming from the most expensive firm.
It is less obvious that in some cases, although very few, permits may also add nothing to
the policy design.25 Now take the case in which v > 0 and ρ = −1. To see why the introduction
of some permits in addition to the standard is not welfare increasing, consider the eﬀect of
issuing an arbitrarily small amount of permits (i.e., eh0 close to cero) that are just binding for
one firm in the sense that this is the only firm reducing beyond the standard. When ρ = −1,
the binding firm is exactly the one with the lowest abatement cost (i.e., γ = γ) but with the
highest production cost (i.e., β = β). The introduction of permits will be ineﬃcient without
suﬃcient abatement cost heterogeneity (i.e., −γ/β suﬃciently high) such that the savings in
abatement costs more than oﬀset the increase in production costs.
The exact shape of the region in which the hybrid policy dominates either single-instrument
policy depends on the parameter values. A simple numerical exercise may be useful. In Figure
1, line ch=p indicates the combinations of v and ρ for which the hybrid policy just converges to
25 If the damage function is convex in the level of pollution, we should expect to have a few more cases in which
the hybrid policy converges to the standards-alone policy.
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the permits policy for the following parameters values: P = k = c = 4, h = 2, β = 2, β = −2,
γ = 1, γ = −1.26 The figure also includes the line c∆=0 (i.e., combinations of v and ρ that yield
∆ps = 0) and the line c∆E=0 (i.e., combinations of v and ρ for which the permits policy and the
standards policy yield the exact same level of emissions). One can distinguish three regions in
the figure. The first region (H=P>S)–to the left of ch=p–includes all those combinations of v
and ρ for which the hybrid policy coincides with the permits policy, which in turn, dominates
the standards policy. For example, if v = −0.5 and ρ = 0.6, the first row of Table 1 shows
that social net benefits (W ) are 33% higher under the permits policy than under the standards
policy. Note also that in some places of this region, the hybrid policy does not improve upon
the permits-alone policy despite the fact that emissions are higher than under a standards-
alone policy. The logic behind this result is that the introduction of some binding standard (in
combination with permits) would not only reduce emissions but also increase production and
abatement costs. And in this particular region, the latter eﬀect dominates.
The second region (H>P>S)–between the lines ch=p and c∆=0–includes all those combi-
nations for which the hybrid policy is superior to the permits-alone policy, which in turn, is
superior to the standards-alone policy. For example, if v = 0.6 and ρ = 0.6, the welfare gain
from implementing the hybrid policy (∆h) is 12.6% of ∆ps, as shown in the second row of Table
1. It is interesting to observe that despite the fact that welfare may not increase by much,
policy designs are quite diﬀerent (the hybrid policy includes a standard that is almost half the
one in the standards-alone policy; though the equilibrium permit price does not vary much).
Finally, the third region (H>S>P) –to the right and below of c∆=0– includes those com-
binations of v and ρ for which the hybrid policy dominates the standards-alone policy, which in
turn, dominates the permits-alone policy. The third row of the table indicates that for v = 0.7
26The simulation is carried out with only four type of firms: (β, γ),(β, γ), (β, γ) and (β, γ). Also, the value of
the diﬀerent parameters limit the range of v to [−0.5, 0.7].
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Figure 1: The optimality of hybrid and single-instrument policies to changes in the correlation
(ρ) and interaction (v) parameters.
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and ρ = −0.5, the gain from implementing the hybrid policy, as opposed to the standards-alone
policy, is substantial, 32.5% of |∆ps|.27
Table 1. Hybrid and single-instrument policies: design and welfare
v ρ xs Req xhs Rheqh Ws ∆ps ∆h
−0.5 0.6 0.65 2.08 0 2.08 123.64 41.08 0
0.6 0.5 0.38 2.07 0.18 1.99 82.04 13.66 1.72
0.7 −0.5 0.36 2.10 0.21 1.49 79.74 −6.37 2.07
6 Conclusions
I have developed a model to study the design and performance of pollution markets (i.e.,
tradable permits) when the regulator has imperfect information on firms’ costs and emissions.
A salient example is the control of air pollution in large cities where emissions come from
many small (stationary and mobile) sources for which continuous monitoring is prohibitively
costly and, therefore, the regulator must rely on monitoring procedures similar to those used
in the traditional command-and-control (CAC) approach of setting technology and emission
standards.
In such cases the superiority of permits over CAC regulation is no longer evident. Permits
do retain the well known cost-eﬀectiveness property of conventional permits programs but
sometimes can provide firms with incentives to choose combinations of output and abatement
technologies that may lead to higher aggregate emissions than under standards, something
that would not occur if emissions were accurately measured. Thus, when (abatement and
production) cost heterogeneity across firms is large, the permits policy is likely to work better.
In contrast, as heterogeneity disappears, the advantage of permits reduces, and standards might
27Note that despite the fact that σγ = 0.5σβ , there is no region in Figure 1 where the hybrid policy converges
to the standards-alone policy.
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work better provided that they lead to lower emissions. Because of this trade-oﬀ between cost
savings and possible higher emissions, I also examine the advantages of a hybrid policy that
optimally combines permits and standards. I find that in many cases the hybrid policy converges
to the permits-alone policy but it almost never converges to the standards-alone policy.
The results of the paper should also shed light into the design of permits market that face
other types of monitoring constraints. Consider, for example, a permits market (even with
observable output and emissions) in which the damages caused by the pollution from diﬀerent
sources are heterogenous and not easily observed.28 If permits are traded from the less damaging
to the more damaging sources, overall damages could increase. If the cost structure of aﬀected
sources is likely to cause such a trading pattern, the results of this paper would suggest the
introduction a hybrid policy in which sources can freely trade permits subject to the restriction
that no firm can emit more than a certain standard.
In addition, the results of the paper are valuable in thinking about the expansion of existing
permits programs. Since sources under the TSP permits program of Santiago are currently
responsible for less than 5% of total TSP emissions, the model developed here can be used to
study the eﬃcient incorporation of other TSP sources that today are subject to command and
control regulation. A good candidate is powered-diesel buses, which are responsible for almost
40% of today’s total TSP emissions. According to Cifuentes (1999), buses that abate emissions
by switching to natural gas are likely to reduce utilization relative to buses that stay on diesel
and that older, less-utilized buses are more likely to switch to natural gas. Since switching to
natural gas is a major abatement alternative, both of these observations would suggest that
the optimal way to integrate buses into the TSP program is by imposing, in addition to the
allocation of permits, an emission standard specific to buses. It may also be optimal to use
28 I thank one of the referees for pointing out this case and its relevance for the Los Angeles’ RECLAIM market.
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diﬀerent utilization factors (eq) for each group of sources. These and related design issues deserve
further research.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is divided in four parts. The first three parts demonstrate that there exist several
combinations of v and ρ for which the hybrid policy converges to the permits-alone policy (note
that a more general proof would require specifying F (β, γ), but this, in turn, would make the
proof particular to the specified distribution function). Part 1 demonstrates so for v = ρ = 0.
Part 2 demonstrates that for v = 0 and ρ 6= 0, the hybrid policy converges to the permits-
alone policy only if ρ > 0. Part 3 demonstrates that for v 6= 0 and ρ = 1, the hybrid policy
always converges to the permits-alone policy if v < 0 but not necessarily so if v > 0. Part 4,
which finishes the proof, demonstrates that for ρ = −1 and some values of v the hybrid policy
converges to the standards-alone policy if −γ/β < (h− v)/c.
Part 1. For ρ = 0, F (β, γ) can be expressed as F β(β)F γ(γ) where F β and F γ are in-
dependent cumulative distribution functions for β and γ respectively (fβ and fγ are their
corresponding probability density functions). Thus, when v = ρ = 0, bγ is independent of β and
the first order conditions (28) and (29) become, respectively
Z β
β
h
hqhp −RheqhiF γ(bγ)fβdβ ≤ 0 (30)
Z β
β
Z γ
bγ
h
−kxhs − γ + hqhs
i
fβ(β)fγ(γ)dγdβ ≤ 0 (31)
where qhp = q
h
s = (P−β)/c. Before solving for Rheqh and xhs , note that from first order condition
(11) we have that −kxhp − γ + Rheqh = 0 for γ ≤ bγ and that −kxhs − γ + Rheqh < 0 for γ > bγ
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(otherwise the standard would not be binding). Since (30) cannot be positive, its solution yields
Rheqh = Ph/c = R∗eq (see (16)). On the other hand, developing (31) we obtain
Z γ
bγ
·
−kxhs − γ +
Ph
c
¸
fγ(γ)dγ ≤ 0
But since Ph/c = Rheqh and −kxhs −γ+Rheqh < 0, the solution of (31) is a corner solution with
xhs = 0.
Part 2. When v = 0 and ρ 6= 0, bγ is independent of β and since Rheqh must be necessarily
positive (otherwise (28) would be positive), the first order condition (28) reduces to
Rheqh − Ph
c
+
h
R β
β
R bγ
γ
βFγβdγdβ
c
R β
β
R bγ
γ
Fγβdγdβ
= 0 (32)
where its last term, which we will denote by ξ to save on notation, is positive (negative) for
ρ < 0 (ρ > 0) and zero otherwise.
On the other hand, the first order condition (29) reduces to
Z β
β
Z γ
bγ
·
−kxhs − γ +
Ph
c
− hβ
c
¸
Fγβdγdβ ≤ 0 (33)
After replacing Ph/c according to (32), (33) can be rewritten as
Z β
β
Z γ
bγ
h
−kxhs − γ +Rheqh + ξiFγβdγdβ − hc
Z β
β
Z γ
bγ βFγβdγdβ ≤ 0 (34)
where its last term (without the negative sign in front) has the exact opposite sign of ξ. Now,
from condition (11) we know that −kxhs − γ + Rheqh < 0 for γ > bγ, so if ρ < 0 there must
be an interior solution (i.e., xhs > 0) because ξ is positive. To see this, let us imagine we
increase the standard xhs from cero to the point where we reach the very first firm for which
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there is no diﬀerence between complying with the standard and buying permits. At this point
−kxhs − γ + Rheqh = 0 but ξ > 0, so condition (34) would be positive. It would be beneficial
then to increase xhs a bit further until (34) reaches cero. Conversely, if ρ > 0, ξ is negative, so
the solution of (34) is indeed a corner solution with xhs = 0.
Part 3. When v 6= 0 and ρ 6= 0, it is useful to first to express qhp (Rheqh, β, γ), xhp(Rheqh, β, γ)
and qhs (x
h
s , β) according to (7), (12) and (13) (simply add the superscript “h”) and then sub-
stitute them into (28) and (29) to obtain, respectively, the first order conditions
Z β
β
Z bγ(β)
γ
·
(R∗eq −Rheqh)µΛ+ 2hv
Λ
¶
+
2hv
Λ
γ − h(ck + v
2)
cΛ
β
¸
Fγβdγdβ ≤ 0 (35)
Z β
β
Z γ
bγ(β)
·
(x∗s − xhs )
µ
Λ+ 2hv
c
¶
− γ − (h− v)
c
β
¸
Fγβdγdβ ≤ 0 (36)
To demonstrate now that the hybrid policy converges to the permits-alone policy if ρ = 1 and
v < 0, it is suﬃcient to show that the extra benefits from introducing xhs > 0 that is just binding
for a marginal firm are negative when Rheqh = R∗eq. For ρ = 1 and v < 0, the cost parameters
of the marginal firm are β > 0 and γ > 0 and the extra benefits are (from (36))
(x∗s − xhs )
µ
Λ+ 2hv
c
¶
− γ − (h− v)
c
β (37)
Since this marginal firm is indiﬀerent between permits and standards, i.e., bγ(β) = γ, we have
from (24) that
γ =
v
c
β − Λ
c
xhs +R
∗eq − Pv
c
(38)
We also know from (9) and (16) that R∗eqc = x∗sΛ+Pv. Using this to substitute R∗eq into (38),
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we obtain an expression for x∗s − xhs that replaced into (37) leads to
2hv
Λ
γ − h(ck + v
2)
cΛ
β < 0 (39)
which demonstrates that the extra benefits are negative.
For ρ = 1 and v > 0, on the other hand, the marginal firm is still (β, γ) and the extra benefits
are also given by (39). But because v > 0, these extra benefits can now be either negative or
positive, in which case it is optimal to implement a hybrid policy with xhs > 0 (using a similar
procedure , it can be demonstrated that when ρ = 1, the authority always wants to use some
permits).
Part 4. Let us now demonstrate that the hybrid policy may converge to the standards-alone
policy for ρ = −1 and some values of v.29 As analogous to Part 3, this will be the case if the
extra benefits from introducing Rheqh > 0 that is just binding for a marginal firm are negative
when xhs = x
∗
s. When ρ = −1, the cost parameters of the marginal firm are β > 0 and γ < 0
and the extra benefits are (from (35))
(R∗eq −Rheqh)µΛ+ 2hv
Λ
¶
+
2hv
Λ
γ − h(ck + v
2)
cΛ
β (40)
Following the same procedure as in Part 3 to obtain an expression for R∗eq−Rheqh, (40) reduces
to −γ − (h− v)β/c, which is negative (and hybrid policy converges to standards-alone policy)
if −γ/β < (h− v)/c.¥
29Note that to work with interior solutions v cannot be any arbitrary value.
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